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Evidence pointing to a cover-up*

Lax security in Cairo and Cologne

Islamic Jihad claims responsibility

High level communications between Gander and Washington

Early official dismissals of sabotage, and explosion or a fire on board

Eyewitness accounts

U.S. military calls for investigation of ground personnel in Cologne

Major General John S. Crosby of the U.S. Army calls for the bulldozing of sites the day after the crash

Arrow Air denied access

Contradiction between the CASB spokesman and the CASB's chief investigator on the "Contents" of the black box tapes

Weapons, ammunition, flares, practice grenades on board?

FBI's Criminal Division involved in the investigation

Autopsy reports

The ice build-up theory: statements by ground crew at Gander / FBI report

Cockpit microphone turned off

Why did the pilot activate a fire extinguisher before impact?

The master fire warning light was turned on.

The Pinkel report

What caused sudden loss of speed?

The board of directors of the CASB divided.

The Sopinka report.

Statement by CASB member Les Filotas.

Benoit Bouchard's letter to CASB board members.

Other points of interest.

List of Exhibits

*(added to the Table of Contents by the author for clarity purposes)


Union of Canadian Transport Employees Report


Cockpit microphone turned off?

The CASB's investigation unearthed early on that the microphone located in the cockpit which is used to record conversations between the pilot, co-pilot or flight engineer was turned off. This is an extremely rare occurrence. It is standard procedure to turn on this microphone at all times. What this mean't was that since both the cockpit voice recorder and the flight data recorder provided no helpful evidence because of damage or malfunction, very vital information was unavailable. Only these valuable recordings could have provided the all important reactions of the flight crew to an explosion or pre-impact fire. The only voice recordings that were proven discernable were the conversations between the aircraft and the airport control tower prior to takeoff which provided no information of value. The January 10, 1986 edition of the Globe and Mail in an interview with chief investigator Peter Boag says the following: "That means accident investigators have none of the conversation between the pilot and co-pilot from the time the plane started its takeoff roll until the crash". (see Exhibit 37)

If we return to section 9 of this document, we can recall the words of Christiane Heaulieu, the CASB's spokesman who said on December 13, 1985: "Both tapes are readable..." (see Exhibit 15) The tapes had been flown the day before to Ottawa by a Transport Canada aircraft and delivered to the NRC Playback Centre at 20:50 hours on December 12. (see Exhibit 18) Whatever Beaulieu was basing that statement on, it raises serious questions as to why one month later they were suddenly not readable and useless to the investigation.


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